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ABSTRACT 
ALSENAID, FELWA RASHID Masters: June : 2020:, Masters of Science in Computing 
Title: A Deep Learning Based Approach To Detect Covert Channels Attacks and Anomaly 
In New Generation Internet Protocol IPv6 
Supervisor of Thesis: Somaya, Al-Maadeed. 
The increased dependence of internet-based technologies in all facets of life 
challenges the government and policymakers with the need for effective shield mechanism 
against passive and active violations. Following up with the Qatar national vision 2030 
activities and its goals for “Achieving Security, stability and maintaining public safety” 
objectives, the present paper aims to propose a model for safeguarding the information and 
monitor internet communications effectively. The current study utilizes a deep learning-
based approach for detecting malicious communications in the network traffic. Considering 
the efficiency of deep learning in data analysis and classification, a convolutional neural 
network model was proposed. The suggested model is equipped for detecting attacks in 
IPv6. The performance of the proposed detection algorithm was validated using a number 
of datasets, including a newly created dataset. The performance of the model was evaluated 
for covert channel, DDoS attacks detection in IPv6 and for anomaly detection. The 
performance assessment produced an accuracy of 100%, 85% and 98% for covert channel 
detection, DDoS detection and anomaly detection respectively. The project put forward a 
novel approach for detecting suspicious communications in the network traffic. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic growth of the internet in the 1980s raised dire warning of internet 
address exhaustion. As a consequence, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) lead the 
development of robust, efficient and secure internet protocol, IPv6. This enhanced 
protocol not only improves the performance but also offers a structured and productive 
approach for packets handling. Although, IPv6 improvise and rationalize the internet 
protocol, it raises a number of several security challenges. The topic has attracted the 
attention of many researchers, striving to address the cyber security concerns. On the 
other hand, with the emergence of new technologies, hackers and cyber criminals are 
actively targeting the exploitation of possible vulnerabilities.  In the early days of IPv6 
implementation, Kelin, an independent security researcher, explored the security 
vulnerabilities and defects in IPv6. Using a dedicated tool, the researcher created covert 
channels which can bypass firewalls and intrusion detection systems. This tool has 
warned the security experts of the need for a convenient mitigation technology. Kelin 
added that, as the adoption of IPv6 expands, more deformities and security flaws will 
be disclosed [1]. With the rapid expansion and prevalence of IPv6 networks, the number 
of threats and defects are growing on a large scale. 
The ever-increasing demand for security countermeasures opens up a new 
research arena among academics and network security enthusiasts. The current paper 
analyzes a number of serious security threats in IPv6 such as covert channels, 
distributed denial of service )DDoS) and anomaly detection.  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Network security specialists are increasingly challenged with novel security 
threats and information loss. The intruders are leveraging the security drawbacks of 
IPv6 through attacks and cyber security violations. IPv6 is susceptible to different forms 
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of attacks such as covert channels, DoS, man in the middle attacks [2]. Covert channels, 
an unconventional security threat, have been evolving over four decades with the rise 
of the concept in the early 1970s [3]. The covert channel emphasizes secrecy and hidden 
communication between two IP addresses. Most commonly, the covert channels can be 
achieved by exploiting shared network resources intended for different communication 
purposes. Such exploited and alternate communication path considered as a violation 
of network security policies. Another term used to express the concept of these 
illegitimate communications is network steganography. It has been noticed that certain 
fields in TCP/IP protocol layers such as network layer, internet layer, transport layer 
and application layer are exploited to establish covert channels. Further to field 
exploitation, certain types of attacks manipulated the relationship between TCP/IP 
layers by crafting packets and creating gaps between headers. With the proliferation of 
internet applications and social media, covert channel attacks also emerged with new 
approaches and modes. Like for instance, stealing user cookies and using the Facebook 
wall as pipe are some of the latest techniques of covert channel attacks [4]. Although 
covert channel attacks have been discussed widely in IPv4, very few studies addressed 
the concept in IPv6. With the increase in the number of networks adopting IPv6, the 
need for an appropriate and efficient countermeasure to mitigate covert channels 
communications arises. There exists a potential for robust, accurate, and less false-
alarming covert channel detection approach. 
Artificial intelligence has a wide variety of useful applications. Due to the 
powerful capabilities of artificial intelligence approaches in classification problems, it 
can be considered as a valuable component in network security. Recently, a large 
number of studies exposed the efficacy of machine learning and deep learning 
applications in the detection of attacks. Therefore, it can be employed for the 
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identification of abnormalities in network traffic. The scarcity of deep learning 
approach for anomaly detection in IPv6, pointing to the need for more research and 
development in the field. By addressing the identified research gap, the present paper 
investigates a machine learning solution for intrusion detection in IPv6 based network. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The current research proposes a deep learning-based approach for the detection of 
attacks in the new generation of the internet protocol IPv6. The paper primarily 
addresses the following objectives: 
 Propose a new feasible framework utilizing a deep learning technique for IPv6 
anomaly detection. 
 Assess the performance of the proposed model for the detection of covert 
channels, DDoS attacks and anomaly in IPv6. 
 Compare the efficiency of the suggested model against existing frameworks. 
1.3 Solution Overview 
The present study put forward a new framework for ensuring increased security 
in the internet protocol version 6 based on the concept of artificial intelligence and 
machine learning. The proposed framework implements the underlying notion of deep 
learning to analyze internet packets and detect abnormalities in the network system. 
The concept of machine learning in IPv6 has been previously assessed only to a 
minimal extent. This gap in the literature, especially for storage based covert channels, 
demands a new mechanism for analysis and classification. Such that the current 
research deeply explores the application of deep learning technique to the aspect of 
covert channel and DDoS attacks detection. The paper also examines the effectiveness 
and performance of the network traffic analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) 
The proliferation of internet based technologies and communication channels 
raises the need for effective security protocols and mechanisms. IPv6, a successor of 
IPv4, is also known as IPng (Internet Protocol next generation) facilitating a 
revolutionary upgrade to internet protocol. IPv6 was introduced with a 128-bit address 
field which essentially allows for the steady growth of the internet. Advantageously, 
the larger address field in IPv6 has overcome the much-feared challenges of “Internet 
addressing shortage” in the late 1980s. The adoption of IPv6 has gained more all-
inclusive popularity due to its advantages to the network world. The percentage of 
global IPv6 deployment as of this writing (May 2020) is estimated to be around 30% 
[5]. Some of the most prominent benefits are reduction in processing time, sub-block 
processing, and Internet Protocol Security support [6]. More importantly, the concept 
of ICMPv6, which combines the neighbor discovery and router advertisement, also 
make the IPv6 a much robust protocol to use in the ever-growing connected world. 
However, the lack of cryptographic protection in IPv6 makes the protocol vulnerable 
against hidden channel and DDoS attacks. 
To the best of knowledge, IPv6 is not particularly new and has been used for 
many years in the field, the deployment of IPv6 has been increasing at an enormous 
scale. Essentially, the header format of IPv6 is the facilitating feature in enabling this 
as a flexible entity. By increasing the length from 20 bytes in IPv4 to 40 bytes in IPv6 
enables it to have abundant address lines and other optional features. The general 
structure of the IPv6 header format according to the RFC 2460 standard is shown in 
Figure 1 and will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
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Figure 1: IPv6 Header Format 
 
 
 
 
The Version field of IPv6 header holds a 4-bit data to recognize the internet 
protocol version similar to the version field of IPV4 header. The traffic Class is an 8-
bit field where the first six-bit indicate the differentiated services (DS) and the last two 
bits refers to the explicit congestion notification (ECN). The Flow Label field is a 20-
bit field, supplemented in IPv6 as opposed to IPv4 which facilitates tracking the flow 
of internet packets. The field following the IPv6 header is a 16-bit Payload Length field 
denotes the same purpose as that of IPv4. The payload field essentially represents the 
payload length of the data packets. The 8-bit Next header field symbolizes an upper 
layer protocol like TCP, UDP, or an optional extension header. Following the Next 
header field is a Hop limit field stating the number of intermediate routers the internet 
packets will traverse through. The Hop limit field is serving the same functionality as 
that of Time-to-live field in IPV4.  The source and destination address field identify the 
sender and receiver of the IPV6 packets. The source and destination address field carry 
128-bit address fields, thus enabling to address a broader range of devices and 
information units. 
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The internet protocol is not highly reliable, demanding additional mechanisms 
to report problems and communicate necessary information. The Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMPV6) is an essential part of modern Internet protocols to 
communicate information on network connectivity issues to the source of transmission 
specially used by network devices like routers. The role of ICMPV6 in internet protocol 
goes beyond error reporting to processing packet datagrams, diagnostics and other 
interlayer functions. It is worth to note that the use of ICMP in IPV6 has significant 
modifications as compared to the implementation of ICMP in IPV4. In IPv6, the ICMP 
will be called for the value of 58 in the header field “Next header”.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ICMPv6 Header Format 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the ICMP header format for IPV6 as per RFC 4443. The 
first field, Type is an 8-bit field to specify the nature of messages such as error and 
informational messages.  The Destination Unreachable, Time exceeded, parameter 
problems, and echo request are some of the examples of ICMPV6 messages. The 
subsequent field, Code, is again an 8-bit field which provide some additional details of 
the message type according to the Type field value. In order to validate the ICMPV6 
message and IPV6 header for any discrepancies, a 16-bit checksum field is employed. 
  
7 
 
The last part of ICMP is of a varying length field, carries the message content based on 
the values of both Type and Code field. Consequently, the overall size of the ICMP 
packet should not exceed 1280 byes, which is the minimum IPV6 MTU. 
2.2 Features of IPv6 
Internet addressing shortage was one of the biggest concerns of information 
scientist in the later 1990s. This adverse situation directs to IEFT (Internet Engineering 
Task Force) to initiate the development of internet protocol version 6 with robust 
address and security features. Extended addressing features of IPv6 is considering as 
one of the significant expansion of the modern internet world. IPv6 offers an address 
range of 128 bits which is quite large as compared to the existing 32-bit address range 
of IPv4. Primarily, IPv6 can accommodate about 3.4 × 1038 addresses which are 
adequate for addressing the exponential growth of network connected devices [7, 8]. 
Another commendable feature of IPv6 is its simplified header format with a fixed size. 
IPv6 propose a 40 bytes fixed header size with eight fields whereas IPv4 has a varying 
header format and size. These particular features enable dynamic routing of IPv6 due 
to the predetermined fields and field values. In a nutshell, IPv6 eradicates the use of 
some of the non-essential fields such as checksum, fragment, protocol, options, and 
“Time to live” [9]. Nevertheless, IPv6 introduced “hop limit” and “Next header type” 
fields for powerful synchronization and packet organization. 
A large number of existing studies in the broader literature have examined 
network security as an enhancement in IPv6 [10-12]. With the mandatory enforcement 
of IPsec in IPv6, as compared to the optionality in IPv4, provides data integrity, 
confidentiality, and authentication as a built-in feature of IPv6. The enhanced security 
features are employed through two security headers, Authentication Header (AH) and 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Both AH and ESP applied conjointly with the 
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security key exchange, IPSec offers access control to all connected system and services 
at the IP layers. Furthermore, IPSec facilitates superior security through connectionless 
integrity, data origin authentication, and packet counter mechanism [13]. 
Quality of networks and internet services plays a significant role in the 
reliability of the communications. IPv6 was introduced with dedicated features to 
overcome the quality of services (QoS) challenges in IPv4 [14]. It is imperative that 
IPv6 emphasizes on the QoS through flow label field in the packet header. The flow 
label values extend an effective mechanism for packet labelling, flow identification and 
its state lookup through effective management of peculiarities like bandwidth, 
reliability controlled jitter and latency [15, 16]. More recently, the IETF has proposed 
and standardized a number of QoS architectures such as Integrated Services (IntServ) 
and Differentiated Services (DiffServ) [15]. In essence, the IPv6 flow label field eases 
the provisions for applying QoS. Another significant feature of IPv6 in comparison to 
the previous protocol is its flexibility in supporting options and extensions. The 
immense size of the address field and other scalable features of IPv6 opens up plentiful 
innovative and collaborative possibilities. Through a robust Dynamic Host 
Configuration protocol version 6 (DHCPv6), IPV6 proposes a relatively lighter auto 
configuration mechanism for interfaces connected to the network. This enhanced node 
automatic configuration mechanism relieves the network from contacting the server 
from time to time, to configure their IP addresses as opposed to IPV4. As such, the 
server required to store the configuration information for each requested device [7]. The 
node to node addressing improves not only the connectivity but also provides increased 
transparency and efficiency. 
Having said that, IPV6 introduced an efficient mechanism for managing routing 
tables. IPV4 faced adverse challenges in managing and storing routing tables for a more 
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substantial number of devices. Mobile nodes connected with IPV4 required to re-
establish its connection with location changes due to the lack of support in handover 
and mobility in IPv4. However, IPv6 is equipped to overcome the mobility support 
through its sophisticated extension headers and support systems. Recent research 
highlights the scalability of IPv6 protocol with IPv6 extension header to provide a better 
authentication, handover and more agile routing mechanisms [7, 17]. 
2.3 Security Vulnerabilities of IPv6 
The latest release of the internet protocol was addressing the growth of reliance 
on the internet and technology by expanding the addressing capabilities. The latest 
release came along with a sophisticated enhancement on the performance and security. 
Although the IPv6 considered several security issues, the design was mostly inherited 
from the previous generation of IPv4. Recent studies reported a number of numerous 
pressing vulnerabilities and threats associated with the IPv6. More specifically, the 
national vulnerability database identified 402 vulnerabilities related to IPv6 [18] 
Similarly, [19] presented a high level overview of the IPv6 associated security concerns 
and possible threats. Despite the enforcement of IPSec to strengthen the security in 
IPv6, there exist several shortcomings and security vulnerabilities. It is worth noting, 
IPv6 inherit some of the security challenges of IPv4 as similar to that of format 
inheritance. IPv6 address field heavily depends on the Media Access Control (MAC) 
raises a more significant security threat. The MAC addresses primarily facilitate 
address spoofing thus enable identification and track devices which intrinsically 
affecting the user’s privacy. With the release of IPv6, attackers adapted hacking tools 
like THC and Scapy to explore IPv6 and to misuse its features. Due to the larger address 
size, the concept of applying port scanning is not anymore a reasonable option in IPv6. 
Due to the absence of identification token in OSI architecture and the IPv6 
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characteristics of assigning multiple addresses, there arises a higher challenge in 
updating the filtering rules of the firewalls and access control list [7, 8]. This poses a 
series of security threats at the access control level. 
Although IPv6 extension header provides supplementary information for 
passing and processing internet packets, there is a higher potential for malicious use. 
Attackers can manipulate the extension header of variable size with padding a series of 
extension headers. The packet manipulation would lead to a Denial of service (DoS) 
and bypassing the firewall policies and intrusion detection systems.  These manipulated 
extension headers circumvent the security policies and facilitate covert channel 
communication. In IPv6, packet fragmentation is performed at the source and 
destination nodes, not by intermediate routers, the presence of fragmentation at the 
nodes enables the attackers to perform the attack in the form of small fragments and 
evading the filtering and detection [20]. The security flaws in IPv6 poses a significant 
threat to communication and demands novel approaches for mitigation. 
2.4 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS) 
Distributed DoS attacks are one of the most common forms of attacks against 
IPv6 protocol. The DDoS attacks are essentially disturbing legitimate communications 
among network connected devices. The intruder disrupts the normal traffic of a network 
or server thus making the resource unavailable. In essence, DDoS attacks are performed 
through exhaustion of a device in a network by overloading it with a large sequence of 
packets leading to the device unavailability. This kind of attacks are violating the 
fundamental principles of information security, commonly known as CIA Triad.  When 
the DoS is executed from multiple distributed computers or botnets, it is referred as 
DDoS attack [21]. The unique characteristics of IPv6 opened up new ways of 
performing DDoS flooding attacks exploiting the new types of extension header, 
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ICMPv6 messages and the dependency on multicast addresses. For instance, the Hop 
by Hop option header contains optional information that should be reviewed by every 
node in the packet path. One possible scenario to trigger DoS attacks is by sending a 
large number of packets with the Hop by Hop option header attached with irregular or 
duplicate options. Upon identifying the irregularity at the hop-by-hop option header, 
the intermediary nodes will send ICMP error messages back to the sender. These 
multiple ICMP error messages and packet examinations at every node would 
significantly impact the performance of the network [22]. What's more, DDoS attack 
are often performed with dual purpose, where the first attack hits the system to install 
a ransomware or malware which eventually leads to significant disruption in the long 
run [23]. Although, IPv4 intrusion detection systems are feasible for IPv6, the 
characteristics and structure of IPV6 raise challenge to apply the same technique of 
IPv6 attack detection [24]. The new uncertainty mandates for novel DDoS attack 
detection techniques in IPv6.  
2.5 Covert Channels Attacks 
The concept of covert channel was first introduced by Butler Lampson to 
address channels not intended for information transfer [25]. The concept has gained 
much popularity among academics and information professionals which was mostly 
addressing the unconventional and secure data transfer. A wider accepted definition to 
covert channel is coined by Gligor and Virgil [26] which emphasizes the denial of 
policy and adoption of property. More recently, Lucena, et al. [27] defined covert 
channel as the communication path which facilitates the transmission of information 
through a nontraditional, illicit, and unconventional method that “violates a system 
security policy”. Piscitello [28] compares covert channel to a secret compartment in a 
brief case to carry sensitive documents or materials through a secured medium. 
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Interestingly, the concept of covert channel is different from any encrypted tunnels or 
channels due to the unobserved nature of data transmission.  
Covert channels form an invisible channel to transfer information secretly by 
manipulating packets information and the timing of the packets. Based on this 
manipulation it classified into two forms: storage based covert channels (CSC) and 
covert timing channels (CTC). The concept of storage based covert channel primarily 
encapsulates the secret data into a shared storage medium like the protocol header, thus 
facilitating asynchronous encoding and decoding. However, the timing based covert 
channels are synchronous in nature, essentially achieved by manipulating the inter 
packet gaps to encode information [29]. 
2.6 Implications of Covert Channels  
The optimal goal of attackers while using covert channels is to circumvent and 
bypass the security policies. Covert channels are mainly used to exfiltrate and infiltrate 
data out of and into a network in an unauthorized hidden manner. Perhaps, it may be 
used to leak sensitive information leading to serious consequences. Usually most of the 
attacks are launched through covert channels evading the firewalls and security 
policies. Delivery of malicious codes could be performed through such hidden 
channels. Though covert channels have some beneficial use like increased security of 
the critical connection, the darker side is not ignorable. Often covert channels are used 
for establishing connections which are prohibited or controlled by the regional 
communication policies. Primarily covert channels would be a threat to information 
privacy where the communication may remain undetected [30].  
Furthermore, controlling the botnets robots could be easily achieved by illicit 
signaling, leading to a DoS attacks affecting network resources.  Recently, the concept 
of covert channel has gained increased attention in image steganography where 
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information is hidden within images. Attackers are suspect to use graphics to obscure 
data in websites as a form of unrecognized communication [31]. The wider possibilities 
of covert channel are its ability in hiding the presence of data as opposed to encryption 
methods. The application of covert channels opened up a new era of research and study 
in the modern network technology. 
2.7 Related Work 
Recent literature has been investigating the vulnerabilities of the new generation 
protocol IPv6 and possible mitigation approaches. The scarcity of reliable IPv6 dataset 
challenges the research community for developing a convenient detection system. 
Multiple algorithms have been proposed utilizing machine learning based classifiers. 
Deep learning, a subset of machine learning, found numerous problem-solving 
applications in speech and image recognition. The practical applications of deep 
learning grow beyond to network traffic analysis and internet security in the recent 
years. There have been several researches addressing the practicality of using deep 
learning techniques in intrusion detection. 
2.7.1 Use of Deep Learning in Networks Packets Analysis 
With the rapid growth of internet and network technologies, the network traffic 
classification has gained more importance than ever before. Though there have been 
several approaches discussed in the literature, most techniques are focusing on 
classification based on predefined features. Deep learning enables to automate the 
process by facilitating the integration of feature extraction and classification into one 
system. Lotfollahi, et al. [32] proposed an approach to analyze network packet using a 
deep learning-based technique, called Deep Packets, for classifying the network traffic. 
The research argues that the Deep Packets outperform all pre-existing models on traffic 
dataset. Similarly, Brun, et al. [33] and McDermott, et al. [34] discussed the use of deep 
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learning technique for addressing network security attacks through packet analysis.  A 
deep neural network model for intrusion detection for Software Defined Network 
(SDN) was developed for identifying and overcoming the possible security threat. The 
SDN based model was later tested using the basic six features of data records in NSL-
KDD dataset [35]. The research in the field are emphasizing on capturing the data 
packets and extracting packet level matrices for assessing the presence of attacks. The 
underlying concept behind packet analysis is the extraction of packet features and its 
efficient classification. 
2.7.2 IPv6 Attacks Detection 
A network intrusion is defined as the forcible or unauthorized activity on a 
network. The network intrusion often leads to endangering both the network and the 
data. As such, network Intrusion detection systems play a vital role in securing 
networks, while providing defense and monitoring traffic for possible attacks. Intrusion 
detections systems are typically categorized into two types as signature based and 
anomaly based intrusion detection systems. The signature based detection approaches 
are based on simple pattern matching techniques which compare a captured event with 
a set of predefined patterns. On the other hand, anomaly based detection is a behavioral 
analysis approach, it extracts the behavior of normal and malicious network activities 
[36]. Roesch [37] proposed a lightweight rule based intrusion detection and prevention 
system named snort for small networks. Snort is principally a signature based approach, 
performs packet sniffing, traffic logging, and traffic analysis for scrutinizing pattern 
matching and consequently detecting attacks. The major drawback of this kind of 
signature based approach is its inability to inspect encrypted packet parts, and detecting 
zero day or new forms of attacks. Besides, Li, et al. [38] suggested a fuzzy rule based 
model for attack detection in IPv6. The model was evaluated by employing a set of data 
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obtained from IPv6 based China Education and Research Network (CERNET2). 
Experimental results of the aforementioned approach showed a high accuracy, and low 
false alarm rates. The model outperformed the detection capabilities of the previously 
discussed snort IDS. Nevertheless, this model lacks the capability to detect user to root 
(U2R) related kind attacks. More recently, a machine learning based approach for IPv6 
has been proposed for detecting router advertisement based flooding attacks. This new 
approach leverages Principal Component Analysis and information gain ratio for 
feature selection while employing a Support vector machine (SVM) for anomaly 
detection. The SVM effectively utilizes the result of the feature selection process to 
train the prediction model for anomaly detection. The performance model had been 
evaluated using a dataset obtained from the National Advanced IPv6 Center of 
Excellence (NAv6). The experimental results of their proposed technique resulted in a 
testing accuracy of 98% and high precision rate  [24] . A novel flow-based network 
intrusion detection system (NIDS) has been introduced by Elejla, et al. [39] for 
detecting the presence of IPv6 DDoS attacks. This new approach evaluated the 
extracted features and the flow representation by applying a number of classification 
techniques using WEKA platform for classifiers such as C4.5 decision tree, Support 
vector machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, k-nearest neighbors (KNN), Random forest trees, 
and Conjunctive rules. The commendable part of the research is the introduction of a 
new ICMPv6 DDoS dataset created through a number of simulations. Further, the 
performance assessment of the proposed intrusion detection system exhibited 
acceptable accuracies and low false positive rates. The flow based IDS has shown 
significant performance improvement as compared to the packet based IDS. 
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2.7.3  IPv6 Covert Channels Detection Techniques 
Machine learning exhibited wider acceptance in packet analysis. Network 
analyst and researchers have been experimenting with various artificial intelligence 
techniques for machine learning in both IPv4 and IPv6. A notable research in the field 
of IPV6 storage covert channel proposes an intelligent heuristic algorithm for detection. 
The particular approach is based on a supervised Machine Learning naive Bayesian 
classifier along with a feature selection algorithm. The naive Bayes classifier is a 
probabilistic classifier focus on the relationship between the attributes and the class. 
Additionally, the C 4.5 decision tree algorithm was employed to derive the most 
prominent features to reduces the computation complexity at the processing phase. For 
the purpose of training the developed model, a primary dataset was created through a 
number of simulated covert channel attacks. The proposed approach analyses the 
header fields of every IPv6 data packets for examining the presence of any 
manipulations. A 10 fold cross validation was performed to assess the performance 
efficiency of the model and resulted in 94% accuracy [40]. Following the supervised 
approach, Salih, et al. [41] proposed a rule-based technique for detecting storage based 
covert channels using the advanced fuzzy logic concept. The concept was essentially 
analyzing ipv6 and icmpv6 header fields for detection. This new technique used a 
genetic algorithm to function as an optimization method for enhancing the fuzzy rules. 
Their work was trained and tested using the primary dataset as similar to that of their 
previous work.  The experimental tests on the proposed framework resulted a detection 
rate of 95% pointing to its efficiency in terms of computational complexity. 
Chourib [42] proposed a covert channel detection model based on three machine 
learning algorithms SVM, k-NN, and deep neural networks. The model adopted real-
life network traffic along with generated benchmark dataset for training and testing the 
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proposed framework. The dataset was created by employing 11 distinct covert channel 
tools and each data record was represented using 20 features. The author evaluated the 
model applying three-fold cross-validation. The research highlighted the commendable 
performance of k-NN over both SVM and DNN. The K-NN model produced an 
accuracy and precision of 90% and 96% while the false positive stay very less as one 
percentage.  The review of works of literature demonstrates the inclination of research 
to protocol or pattern specific covert channel detection approaches. Conversely, Ayub, 
et al. [43] proposed a protocol-independent approach for the detection of a storage-
based covert channel in IPV4. This autonomous approach fundamentally used a 
supervised machine learning algorithm to detect covert channels in IP, TCP, and DNS 
protocol. The model was trained and tested using a primary dataset developed through 
the application proposed by Rowland [44] for the generation of storage covert channel 
at the TCP/IP stack. Also, the research employed DNS2TCP tool for bringing out DNS 
based covert channel datasets. The methodology of the research comprises a 
preprocessing phase where the packets have employed for feature extraction. Following 
the feature extraction, the obtained values are fed into kNN, Decision tree, logistic 
regression, SVM (Linear kernel) and SVM (Gaussian Kernel) machine learning 
classifiers. Essentially, the covert channel was encoded in fields such as the IP 
identification field, TCP sequence number field, and DNS query and response names 
fields. The performance assessment of this protocol-independent model illustrates that 
SVM with Gaussian kernel was the most efficient classifiers in IP and TCP protocols. 
Nonetheless, the decision tree outperformed the rest of the machine learning techniques 
in the detection of the covert channel at the application layer (DNS). 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
The present study utilizes the underlying concept of deep learning technique for 
the covert channel detection in IPV6 network. The proposed model principally 
employed the concept of convolution neural network (CNN), a subset of deep neural 
networks. CNN has been used for sophisticated data processing tasks due to its ability 
to classify and abstract features from both row and processed data effectively.  
Essentially deep learning models facilitate to learn and represent features of data by 
assessing the nature of data in contrast to human intervened classification. The present 
research is principally based on a supervised machine learning classification technique.  
The issue addressed in the research is essentially a binary classification, where a set of 
captured network packets are classified to two categories as normal and abnormal 
covert communication. The subsequent section will provide a brief overview of CNN 
and the proposed CNN architectures. 
3.1 Convolutional Neural Network  
The Convolution Neural network (CNN) were first coined by a computer 
science researcher Fukushima through a neocognition research [45]. CNN is a deep 
learning model which is capable to accept inputs and differentiate or classify various 
objects within the input for further processing. Due to the ability to perform feature 
engineering independently, the technique has been applied extensively in image 
classifications and data processing. LeCun’s investigation on deep learning argues the 
advantages of CNN over other approaches for classification, especially due to its unique 
characteristics and suitability to handle certain type of data. CNN performs the best for 
data following structure such as data in form of multiple arrays, data with strong local 
correlation, and data with invariant features to translation and distortion. More 
importantly, the one dimensional CNN (1D-CNN) is suitable for sequential data or 
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natural language processing whereas 2D-CNN can be employed to classify traffic 
images and network traffic classification. Recently, network security research is 
utilizing this CNN based concept for traffic analysis and malware classification.  
Nevertheless, network traffic is often considered as sequential data with one 
dimensional byte flow with hierarchical structure. In comparison to the natural 
language processing (NLP) technique, the byte, packets, and session are similar to that 
of word, character, and sentence respectively [46]. For instance, recent studies 
investigating the application of CNN in NLP employed a 1D-CNN for performing text 
classification and sentiment analysis. 
3.2 Proposed CNN Architecture 
Research demonstrates the evolution of CNN and deep learning models for 
serving different purposes in network analysis. The present research adopted a model 
as illustrated in Figure 3 which constitutes three convolutional layers. The proposed 
model enables the classification and features extraction without human intervention. 
The first layer is the input layers which accept the data ready to be processed and fed 
into the subsequent convolution layer. The convolution layer performs the 
mathematical operations for extracting the features of the captured data and fed the data 
into a max pooling for size reduction and repeat the process for two remaining 
convolution max pooling layers. The first convolution layers performed the operation 
with 256 filters each with size 2 and resulted in feature maps. Whereas the second and 
third convolution layers produces 128 and 64 feature maps respectively. The three 
convolution layers in the model employ a sigmoid activation function for activating 
nodes. Each convolution layer is followed by a max pooling layer to produce an abstract 
representation of the parameters thus reducing the computational cost. A dropout layer 
with dropout rate of 50% is included in the architecture to avoid any overfitting and 
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enhancing robustness of the model. Lastly, a dense layer was designed to perform 
classification on extracted features maps from preceding layers. This layer utilizes 
ReLu and sigmoid activation function for performing the classification. The two 
activation functions and convolutional layers filter sizes are selected based on a series 
of experiments. The process of implementing the proposed CNN model consist of four 
phases. In the first phase, the hyperparameters were selected and trained the CNN 
model in the second phase. In each epoch, the performance of the training is validated. 
Lastly the performance of the resulted model is evaluated. The process will continue to 
phase one forming a circular pattern optimal model is obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The proposed CNN architecture 
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3.3 Performance Evaluation Metrices 
Evaluating the performance of proposed algorithm is an inevitable part of machine 
learning model development. There exist numerous evaluation metrics varying based 
on tasks such as classification, clustering, ranking, and regression. Nevertheless, the 
current research measures for binary classification using the notation such as accuracy, 
precision, recall, F1 score to evaluate and judge the performance of the proposed model.  
3.3.1 Accuracy 
Accuracy is the most common and less complex measures. The accuracy 
evaluation metric primarily assesses the effectiveness of a classification model in terms 
of ratio of acceptably classified samples to the total number of samples. In another 
word, accuracy can be termed as the degree of accurate prediction of any model. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
3.3.2 Precision 
The evaluation measure precision pointing to the fraction of detected positive which 
are truly correct. In essence, precision compares results from both positive and negative 
trials and estimate the total posterior probability. It is the ratio of correct positive results 
to the number of classifier predicted positive results. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
3.3.3 Recall 
The measure of recall indicates the proportion of actual positives predicted as positive. 
In contrast to the precision value, recall is not about identifying all positives, rather 
about capturing all positives as positives. Whereas, precision is about being precise and 
capture the correct value. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
3.3.4 F1 score 
F1 score is required when there is a need to balance between precision and recall 
value. It is fundamentally a harmonic mean between precision and recall holding a 
value range of [0,1]. F1 score helps to determine the preciseness and robustness of a 
classifier. 
𝐹1 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 2.  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
3.4 Dataset 
Research processes require efficient dataset to train and test the proposed 
models. The present research adopts four distinct datasets for assessing the performance 
of the developed model. The first dataset is a new dataset created for the purpose of 
testing the viability of the proposed model in the detection of covert channel attacks in 
IPv6. The second and third datasets are obtained from an open-source platform, which 
are utilized for evaluating the performance of the proposed model in packet analysis. 
Lastly, the fourth was based on a network flow based representation of ICMPv6 DDoS 
attacks. The subsequent sections will provide a brief overview of the utilized datasets 
and the conducted experiments. 
 
3.4.1 IPV6 covert channel dataset 
Considering the scarcity of IPv6 based covert channel dataset, a new dataset has 
been created through a number of covert channel attack simulations on a controlled 
network topology developed using oracle virtual GNS3 platform [47]. The simulated 
network topology basically consists of two Local Area Network (LAN)s each is 
compromised of a victim and an attacker. Covert channel attacks were triggered using 
Scapy and THC-IPv6 toolkits through manipulation of IPv6 and ICMPv6 fields [48, 
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49]. A sample scapy code for covert channel generation illustrates the manipulation of 
ICMPv6 code and type field is given below. 
#scapy>>>send(IPv6(dst=“fe80::3c79:6d52:d355:9381”)/ICMPv6EchoReque
st(type=129,code=99)) 
Further, the manipulated packets were captured using Wireshark to create a 
number of covert channel instances. Figure 4 demonstrate a packet representation of 
the previously generated covert channel captured using Wireshark. Correspondingly, 
the features of the captured packets are extracted by employing a C program. The 
extracted features are then converted into numerical formats in order to make it 
compatible for processing using the proposed model. The resulted dataset has been used 
for detecting and testing covert channel attacks in IPV6. Each record is a representation 
of IPv6 and ICMPv6 header fields, described by 9 attributes, as illustrated in Table 1. 
In addition, the instances will have a class label to identify the existence of covert 
communication. Table 2 illustrates a sample of the generated dataset which consist of 
both normal and abnormal records in binary representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Encoding a random value in the ICMPv6 code field using scapy 
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Table 1. Covert channel dataset's features 
Category No. Attribute Name 
IPv6 header 1 Traffic_class 
2 Flow_label 
 3 Payload_length 
 4 Next_header 
 5 Source_address 
 6 Destination address 
ICMPv6 header 7 ICMPv6_Type 
 8 ICMPv6_Code 
 9 ICMPv6_Payload 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample of the covert channel dataset 
Traffic 
Class 
 
Flow 
label 
Payload 
length 
Next 
header 
Src.
add 
Dst. 
add.  
ICMP 
Type 
ICMP 
Code 
ICMP 
Payload 
Class 
0 0 8 58 2 1 255 0 0 0 
0 0 8 58 1 2 129 87 0 1 
0 0 8 58 1 2 128 197 0 1 
0 0 8 58 4 3 129 0 0 0 
0 0 8 58 3 4 1 227 0 1 
0 0 8 58 1 2 0 222 0 1 
0 0 8 58 4 3 128 0 0 0 
0 0 8 58 3 4 1 77 0 1 
0 0 8 58 1 2 129 190 0 1 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 NSL-KDD Dataset 
The NSL KDD set is an open-source dataset, from the Canadian Institute of 
cybersecurity, employed in the current research for detecting attacks in IPV6. This 
dataset principally used for testing the efficiency and performance of the proposed 
model in attacks detection. The aforementioned dataset consists of 41 features 
representing the traffic with a label to portray the malicious communication. It has been 
observed that 11 features, comprising some of the primary features and time-relevant 
features of those instances, are standard for both IPv6 and IPv4. Having said that, the 
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proposed model considers 11 features as demonstrated in Table 3 for testing the 
presence of attacks [50]. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. NSL-KDD dataset features 
Category No. Attribute Name 
Basic feature 1 Protocol type 
2 Service 
 3 Flag 
 4 Src bytes 
 5 Land 
Content related feature 6 Logged in 
Time related features 7 Count 
 8 Srv count 
 9 Same srv rate 
 10 Diff srv rate 
 11 Srv diff host rate 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 DARPA 1999 Dataset 
The present study performs a comparative analysis with existing covert channel 
detection models like Enhanced Naïve Bayes classifier (NBC) and New intelligent 
Heuristic algorithm (NIHA) [40, 51]. The aforementioned models were practicing the 
attacks detection by means of the benchmark DARPA dataset. Although, this dataset is 
limited with IPV6 attack records, both present and previous research utilized this 
dataset to evaluate the performance of the classifiers. The DARPA 1999 dataset is a 
simulation based dataset, consist of various normal and malicious network traffic 
records represented in an IPv4 packet based format. The data records constitute of 41 
features representing the basic, time, contents and host based network traffic attributes.  
The DARPA dataset is essentially a predecessor to the NSL KDD dataset. Primarily, 
the Covert channel detection can be applied through inspecting the session data of 
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network communication [52]. As such, the DARPA dataset consisting of a number of 
session-based records, which further facilitate in extracting the characteristics of benign 
and malicious communications.  
3.4.4 Flow based DDoS attacks dataset 
DDoS attacks found to be the most common form of attacks against ipv6 
networks [2]. Primarily, the DDoS attacks dependence on ICMP demands the need for 
an explicit dataset to test the performance in IPv6. The present research adopted a flow 
based dataset of ICMPv6 based DDoS attacks developed by a group of researchers from 
the university of Saint Malaysia. The dataset consists of a combination of normal and 
abnormal traffic records collected from a real IPv6 network and a virtual environment 
respectively. Further, the dataset includes around 92,000 records, each consist of 11 
features as illustrated in Table 4 and a class label [53]. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Flow based DDoS dataset features 
No. Attribute Name Description 
1 ICMPv6 Type  Type of the ICMPv6 message 
2 Packets Number  Number of packets send within the flow 
3 Transferred Bytes  Number of bytes sent from the source to the destination node 
4 Duration Length of the flow 
5 Ratio Ratio of bytes transferred in the flow 
6 Length Standard deviation of the packets length 
7 Flow label Standard deviation of the Flow labels of the flow packets 
8 Hop limit Standard deviation of the Hop limits of the flow packets 
9 Traffic Class Standard deviation Traffic classes of the flow packets 
10 Next Header Standard deviation of the next headers of the flow packets 
11 Payload length Standard deviation of the packets payload lengths 
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3.5 Experimental Setup 
The proposed model was trained and tested using a Mac workstation (Mac OS 
10.12.6), with a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB RAM. The deep learning 
model was developed using the python programming language. The broader choice of 
libraries in Python encouraged the use of Python for machine learning and artificial 
intelligence in recent times. Scikit-learn, Pandas, TensorFlow, and Keras are libraries 
which were used in conjunction with python 3.6 for implementing the proposed CNN 
architecture. 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Cross Validation 
The Cross-validation is a commonly used technique for evaluating the 
performance of machine learning models. In cross-validation, a portion of the sample 
is allocated for training while the remaining will be used for testing the model. K-fold 
cross-validation is a popular model which ensures the availability of data samples in 
both training and testing through various iterations. The underlying concept of K-fold 
cross-validation is that the data sample will be divided into K equal parts, where a 
specific number of folds are allocated for training and testing.  The choice to administer 
a new set of test data on every iteration makes the technique suitable for estimating the 
behavior of machine learning models. As such, the current study practices a 10 fold 
cross-validation model for training and testing the proposed covert channel attack 
detection algorithm.  To be more specific to the present scenario, one portion or 10% 
of the sample is employed for testing and the remaining 90% for training the model.   
4.2 Detection Results 
The performance of the desired model was evaluated in terms of accuracy, 
precision, recall, and F1 score using ten-fold cross-validation. The detection testing was 
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carried out through two experiments and are described in the subsequent sections. 
4.2.1 IPv6 covert channel detection 
The covert channel detection experiments were performed on the primary dataset. The 
experimental results are illustrated in  
Figure 5 and Figure 6, which represents the accuracy versus number of epochs and 
loss versus number of epochs, respectively. Figure 6 exhibits a reduction in loss with 
the increase of epochs, pointing to a significant decline in the false detection or 
classification error. Similarly,  
Figure 5 demonstrates the improvement in accuracy with an increment in epoch for 
both testing and training phases. The experimental evaluation uncoiled a value of 100% 
for accuracy. Correspondingly, both precision and recall hold a value of 100% indicates 
the favorable performance of the developed model. It is also worth noting that F1 score 
for the experiments signified an overall improved functioning of the model through a 
value of one as presented in Table 5. The results of the covert channel detection 
experiment are revealed in Figure 7. The illustrations and evaluation metrics are 
pointing out the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed scheme in covert channel 
attack detection.  
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Figure 5. IPv6 covert channel detection accuracy 
 
Figure 6. IPv6 covert channel detection loss 
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Figure 7. Covert channel detection results 
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4.2.2 IPv6 network anomaly detection 
Using the NSL KDD open-source dataset, a network security attack detection 
was launched using the proposed model. The experimental results for the training phase 
as depicted in  Figure 8 and Figure 9 reveal the variation of both accuracy and loss with 
the rise of epoch for IPv6 anomaly detection. The curve in Figure 9 demonstrate the 
commendable drop in loss with the increment of the epoch. However, Figure 8 
instantiates the strengthening of accuracy with the increment of the epoch. The 
evaluation metrics have proven a higher degree of efficacy in network anomaly 
detection with a value of 98% for accuracy, precision, and recall, as provided in Table 
5. Accordingly, the model shows a commendable performance potency with 98% for 
F1 score. The summary of network anomaly detection is depicted in Figure 10. The 
model has proven to be very beneficial in terms of both anomaly detection and covert 
channel detection in IPv6. The evaluation matrix has shown a remarkable performance 
efficacy disclosing the practical use of the model in a real-time network setting. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. IPv6 anomaly detection experiemnt accuracy 
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Figure 9. IPv6 anomaly detection experiemnt loss 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Anomaly detection results 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Experimental results of anomaly detection 
Experiment Accuracy Precision Recall Loss F1 Score 
IPv6 covert channel detection 1 1 1 0 1 
Anomaly detection in IPv6 
network 
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.98 
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4.2.3 Comparative analysis 
             The third phase of experimental evaluation addresses a comparative study of 
classifiers performance. This comparison examines the existing covert channel 
detection models like Naïve Bayes classifier, Enhanced NBC, and NIHA. The graphical 
representation of both accuracy and loss for the detection performance using DARPA 
dataset is provided in Figure 11 and  
Figure 12 respectively. The model illustrates a significant increase in performance with 
the increase in epoch for both training and testing phases. Likewise, the illustration of 
loss indicates a considerable decrease in value with the increase in epoch. The rate of 
accuracy and loss are pointing to the outstanding efficiency of the proposed model. 
Figure 13 indicate the low false alarm rate of the classifier. The comparative study 
results of the proposed solution as depicted in Figure 14 demonstrate a superior 
performance in precision and accuracy with a value of 99%. Nonetheless, both 
enhanced NBC [41] and NIHA [40] indicates an accuracy of 96% and precision of 98%, 
which is relatively lower than the suggested model. Similarly, the Naïve Bayes 
classifiers results shows a noteworthy difference in performance with accuracy and 
precision as 80% and 90% correspondingly. These results indicate the significant 
efficiency of the current model in network packet analysis. 
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Figure 11. Accuracy of the proposed model using DARPA dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Loss of the proposed model using DARPA dataset 
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Figure 13. Results of attacks detection using DARPA dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Comparative analysis of the accuracy and precision  
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4.2.4 IPv6 based DDoS Attacks Detection 
DDoS is one of the most challenging network security risks associated with 
IPv6. The proposed model was assessed using the ICMPv6 based DDoS attacks dataset, 
which essentially evaluates the detection efficacy for DDoS attacks. In order to enhance 
the performance for DDoS detection, the model has been customized with minor 
modification at the layers level. The testing results indicate an accuracy of 85% with 
precision and recall as 99% and 68% respectively. Further the F1 score results in 81% 
pointing to the commendable performance of the model in the detection. Figure 17 
summarizes the testing results obtained for the DDoS attacks detection. A comparison 
of proposed model’s with a model drawn from literature, both utilizing the same dataset, 
pointing to the acceptable performance of the current model. Although both the models 
are addressing the same dataset, the current project has got access to the dataset with 
8K missing records. However, the performance did not deteriorate where the previous 
model produced about 85.66% while the present model met 85% accuracy [39].  
Figure 15 illustrates the model accuracy which further show the increase of 
accuracy with the increase in epoch. Similarly, the model loss has presented through 
Figure 16, pointing to the significant decrease in values with the increase in epoch. The 
model loss plot highlights the performance efficacy of the current model. 
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Figure 15. Accuracy of the proposed model in DDoS detection 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Loss of the proposed model in DDoS detection 
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Figure 17. Results of DDoS attacks detection 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
With the increasing dependency on internet-based technologies and the 
emergence of novel security threats demands rigorous research in network anomaly 
detection techniques. The covert channel, a method for embedding and hiding 
information, has been exploited in recent years for launching various form of attacks.  
Principally, the covert channel could be encoded using unused or reserved bits in the 
packet headers calls for the complexity in its detection’s schemes. Most importantly, 
such attack challenges detection by the traditional mitigation principles and rules like 
firewalls. The current circumstances raise the need for advanced anomaly detection 
technique. The present research aimed to study and propose a new, feasible framework 
for intrusion detection in IPV6 using a deep learning technique. The proposed model 
was leveraging the underlying concept of convolutional neural network in packet 
analysis and classification. The aforementioned model was developed in python 
programming language and performed a series of experiments using mainly three 
datasets. The assessment results of the proposed model proved to have an accuracy of 
100% for IPv6 covert channel attack detection, 98% for anomaly detection, and 85% 
for DDoS attacks. That being said, the reduced computational cost, minimal error rate, 
and higher accuracy make this model applicable to implement in the real-time network 
environment. 
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5.1 Future Research Directions 
Deep learning-based approach, explicitly using CNN and RNN based 
techniques are growing importance with the successful adoption and feasible 
application in complex problem-solving.  The present research faced challenges with 
obtaining an open-source dataset for IPV6, specifically for covert channel attacks. 
There exists a demand for contributing to the development of an open-source dataset, 
which would further facilitate the research community for engaging in IPV6 security 
research. Besides, CNN has proven to be a convenient approach for image processing 
and pattern recognition. Leveraging the effectiveness of CNN in image processing, the 
current paper recommends the possibility of implementing a graphical representation 
of network data packets. Such graphical representation can further extend to analyze 
with CNN for covert channel or network anomaly detection in IPv6. 
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